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ABSTRACT 
 
AMICUS CURIAE SUBMISSIONS  
FROM NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATION: 
THE APPELLATE BODY, IN TOTAL DEADLOCK 
 
By 
 
Jung-Hee Park 
 
Recently, there have been a number of controversies concerning Non-
governmental organizations’ participation in the World Trade Organization. 
Considering the close relationship between Non-governmental organizations and 
other international organizations, especially the United Nations, the strong arguments 
for excluding NGOs from the WTO is anomalous. Since there are no contestable 
arguments presented by the pro side, which claims that NGOs’ participation in the 
WTO can provide more information, and that the NGOs’ role is essential, especially 
in regards to environmental matters, the countering opinions are mainly focused on 
the potential practical procedural problems, rather than addressing any legitimate 
opposition to the pro argument. Although this issue seemed to be brought to a close 
through the Shrimp/Turtle case, in which the Appellate Body’s finding permitted 
NGOs’ submission to the panel stage, the practical problems exposed in latter cases 
clearly showed that the con side’s concerns were not groundless. Furthermore, by 
excluding all 17 amicus submissions in the most recent case, the Asbestos case, the 
Appellate Body plainly demonstrated its current situation of being at a total deadlock. 
This paper examines the process through which the Appellate Body permitted NGOs 
to submit their briefs to the DSB, and the DSU Agreements on which the Appellate 
Body was based. This examination will be conducted by review of the WTO cases in 
which the issue of the amicus curiae briefs were addressed. The exposed practical 
procedural problems thereof, and the Appellate Body’s efforts to overcome these are 
also presented. In addition, in spite of the Appellate Body’s efforts, the remaining 
complications in establishing a comprehensive agenda for the future are examined, 
with particular attention on the fundamental conflict which inhibited the Appellate 
Body’s efforts in creating such a firm resolution. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 
 
 
The completion of this thesis would not have been possible without the invaluable 
support of many people, whom it is a pleasure for me to acknowledge at this time. 
First and foremost, I would like to thank my thesis supervisor, Professor Dukgeun 
Ahn, who has served as a perpetual source of knowledge and guidance. I would also 
like to express gratitude to Dean Gill-Chin Lim, Associate Dean Jong-Il You, 
Professor Woochan Kim, and all of the other Professors of the School of Public 
Policy and Management, Korean Development Institute – I am sincerely appreciative 
for their precious time and insightful advice. Finally, I would like to send a special 
thanks to all my friends and family who have encouraged me in my studies at KDI 
School, and particularly throughout the writing of my thesis. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 i
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
1. The Rise of NGOs in the Global Arena 
2. The WTO as an Inter-governmental Trade Organization &  
the Dispute concerning NGO’s Participation in the WTO 
 
II. SHRIMP/TURTLE CASE 
1. The Origin of an Affair 
2. The Panel Stage 
A. The Panel’s Decision 
B. Implications of the Panel’s Ruling 
3. The Appellate Body’s Decision 
4. Implications of the Appellate Body’s Ruling: Who is the Beneficiary? 
 
III. CARBON STEEL CASE 
1. The Origin of an Affair 
2. The Panel Stage 
3. The Appellate Body Stage 
A. The Appellate Body and Discretionary Authority 
B. The Appellate Body’s Decision 
 
IV. PRACTICAL PROBLEMS EXPOSED IN THE CARBON STEEL 
ASE C
1. Lack of Timetable and Format 
2. Discretionary Authority: Unclear Criterion in Brief Selection 
3. The Amicus Curiae Brief which was Already Rejected by the Panel 
 
V. ASBESTOS CASE 
1. The Origin of an Affair 
2. The Panel’s Decision: Sticking to its Original Position 
3. The Appellate Body’s Efforts: ‘Additional Procedure’ in the Asbestos Dispute 
4. The Appellate Body’s Decision 
 ii
VI. FUTURE AGENDA 
1. Inconsistency between the Panel and the Appellate Body 
2. A Deluge of Non-requested Briefs 
3. Clear Criterion in Brief Selection 
4. The DSB as an Inter-governmental Judicial Organization versus NGOs’ Own 
Legal Interpretation 
 
VII. CONCLUSION: NEW POSITION OF THE DSB IN 21ST CENTURY 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
APPENDIX A 
The Number of NGOs in Consultative Status with the 
ECOSOC 
APPENDIX B 
Privileges and Obligations of NGOs in Consultative Status 
with the ECOSOC 
APPENDIX C WT/DS135/9, 8 November 2000 
APPENDIX D 
1. 11 of 17 Amicus Curiae Briefs Submitted within the Time 
Limit of Noon on Thursday, 16 November 2000 
2. Six of 17 Amicus Curiae Briefs Submitted after the 
Deadline of Noon on Thursday, 16 November 2000 
APPENDIX E 
Legal Texts Pertaining to Amicus Curiae, NGOs and the 
WTO 
 
 
 iii
 iv
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS 
 
 
CONGO Conference of NGOs (in Consultative Relationship with UN) 
DESA Department of Economic and Social Affairs 
DSB Dispute Settlement Body 
DSU 
Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement
of Disputes 
EC European Communities 
ECOSOC Economic and Social Council 
GATT General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 
ILO International Labour Organization 
NGO Non-governmental Organization 
SCM Subsidies and Countervailing Measures 
UN United Nations 
UNESCO UN Education, Scientific and Cultural Organization 
UNHCR Office of the UN High Commisioner for Refugees 
WTO World Trade Organization 
 
 
 
 
 1 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 
The Appellate Body’s report on the Asbestos case1, which was published on 
March. 12th , 2001, repelled Non-Governmental Organizations in its decision to reject 
all amicus curiae briefs submitted from 17 NGOs. Now, the Dispute Settlement Body, 
which is regarded as the most successful outcome of Uruguay Round, is confronted 
with serious trial. This challenge started with the issue of whether NGOs have access 
to the World Trade Organization or not. The issue, which originated from whether or 
not NGO participation in matters of the WTO is desirable, turned to whether NGOs 
participation could be justified under the WTO Agreements.  In the Shrimp/Turtle 
case 2  and in the Carbon Steel case 3 , the Appellate Body decided that NGO’s 
submission to the panel and to the Appellate Body, respectively is not incompatible 
with the provisions of the Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the 
Settlement of Disputes4. Based on this Appellate Body’s decision, NGOs have tried to 
submit their briefs to the DSB in several cases, and it is during this process that a lot 
                                                
1 European Communities – Measures Affecting Asbestos and Asbestos-containing Products 
(hereinafter ‘Asbestos’), WT/DS135/AB/R (12 March 2001). 
2 United States – Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products (hereinafter 
‘Shrimp/Turtle’), WT/DS58/AB/R (12 October 1998). 
3 United States – Imposition of Countervailing Duties on Certain Hot-rolled Lead and Bismuth 
Carbon Steel Products Originating in the United Kingdom (hereinafter ‘Carbon Steel’), 
WT/DS138/AB/R (10 May 2000). 
4 Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes (hereafter ‘DSU’); 
Shrimp/Turtle, above note 2, at paras 102-107; Carbon Steel, above note 3, at para 39. 
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of problems have been exposed. 
 
In this paper, I examine the WTO cases in which the issue of the amicus 
curiae briefs were addressed, and present the kinds of problems that were disclosed in 
the cases. More specifically, in the Introduction, I present when and how NGOs show 
their head in the global arena. In addition, what types of intrinsic attributes the WTO 
keeps as an international trade organization, and an argument concerning NGO’s 
participation in the WTO is also provided in the Introduction. In Section II and III, 
the Shrimp/Turtle case and the Carbon Steel cases are reviewed respectively, and in 
this process, I present the DSU Agreements in which the Appellate Body based 
justifying its authority to receive amicus curiae briefs from NGOs. Additionally, the 
implications of these decisions are also discussed. In Section IV, I examine the 
practical problems exposed in the Carbon Steel case. In Section V, I present what 
kind of efforts was made by the Appellate Body in order to resolve problems exposed 
in the Carbon Steel case through examining the Asbestos case. Section VI provides 
recommendations for a future agenda. The conclusion is given in Section VII. 
 
 
 3 
1. The Rise of NGOs in the Global Arena 
 
The term “Global citizen society” is not new anymore. Indeed, since the  
1970’s, the activities of international NGOs have dramatically increased in quantity. 
However, these activities are not an unprecedented phenomenon that was only 
appeared in recent years. These NGOs have already played a significant role on the 
international stage since the 19th century. According to one survey, there were more 
than one hundred international NGOs before the 20th century, and 61, 131 and 112 
international NGOs were created during 1900-1904, 1905-1909 and 1910-1914, 
respectively. As showed in the survey, the establishment of international NGOs has 
remarkably increased since the 20th century, and this increase in quantity resulted in 
more than 2000 international NGOs in the middle of the 1970’s, reaching almost 
6000 in 19965. 
 
The rise of international NGOs is not confined to merely a quantitative 
increase. These NGOs have extended their range of activities in the global arena, and 
their cooperation with the United Nations is particularly notable. Actually, it is these 
                                                
5 Sungsoo, Joo, and Youngjin, Seo. United Nations, NGOs, and Global Civil Society. Seoul: 
University of Hanyang Press, 2000, at pages 10-11. 
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NGOs that made it possible for the formation of several present international 
organizations, such as ILO, UNESCO and UNHCR. These NGOs not only played an 
important role on establishing special organizations controlled by the United Nations, 
but have also broadened the scope of their activities based on a close relationship 
with the  UN. For instance, the number of NGOs having consultative status with the 
Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) was only 41 in 1948, but in 1999, it 
increased to 1701 6 . Without doubt, this would not have been possible without 
cooperation between the U.N and the various NGOs. Indeed, the Non-Governmental 
Organizations Section of the United Nations Department of Economic and Social 
Affairs (DESA) handles matters related to NGO consultative status with the 
ECOSOC through the ECOSOC Committee on NGOs. The Section also assists and 
supports the conference of NGOs in consultative status (CONGO), and facilitates 
CONGO Members’ participation at UN meetings and conferences7. 
 
In case of the UN, NGOs involvement in international organizations is 
accepted without serious resistance, and does not expose practical problems. 
                                                
6 Ibid at pages 11-13. 
7 The United Nations, NGOS and the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC): The United Nations 
Department of Economic and Social Affairs – DESA, online, Internet, 3 May. 2001. 
http://www.un.org/partners/civil_society/ngo/n-ecosoc.htm. 
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Considering this, it is unique that there are still acute arguments concerning NGO 
participation in the WTO. However, in examining the internal characteristics of the 
WTO, some of the possible reasons for controversy become apparent.  
 
2. The WTO as an Inter-governmental Trade Organization &  
the Dispute concerning NGO’s Participation in the WTO 
 
Recently, there have been a number of controversies concerning NGOs’ effort 
to participate in international trade policy-making activities. The supporting 
arguments were based on the expected benefit from providing NGOs with the  
opportunity to observe meetings, and to submit their own documents to the WTO. 
Daniel C. Esty, one of the supporters of NGO involvement, maintained that NGOS 
can help the WTO to be more authoritative, fair, responsive, representative, and 
effective, by facilitating a flow of information to and from decentralized citizens, 
thereby diffusing concerns about its democratic deficit. Moreover, by competing with 
governments in the WTO’s analytic realm, NGOs could broaden the base of 
information and thinking upon which decisions are made, and thus improve the 
quality, authoritativeness, and perceived fairness of the policy choices and judgments 
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emanating from the WTO8. There is no doubt that NGO’s access to the WTO can 
provide it with more information, and thus, can broaden the base of analysis on which 
decisions rest.  
 
NGOs also can provide an additional oversight and audit mechanism. Daniel 
Esty indicated that: 
 
Well-informed citizen groups can act as watchdogs of national governments 
and report on whether they are fulfilling their obligations under international 
economic law. With better access to documents and meetings, NGOs also 
would be in a position to review and critique WTO performance. While this 
may not seem intuitively attractive to those in Geneva, the value of peer 
review is now widely appreciated9. 
 
As noted above, NGOs can play at least two significant roles: as a service 
provider and as a watchdog. Furthermore, given that the world economy is becoming 
more and more globalized, there is an urgent need for solving worldwide issues, such 
as environmental concerns, which require collective action. For instance, in order to 
protect certain animal species, insofar as we do not want them to be extinct, there 
                                                
8 Esty, Daniel C. “Non-Governmental Organizations at the World Trade Organization: Cooperation, 
Competition, or Exclusion,” Journal of International Economic Law, Volume 1, Issue 1 (1998): 123-
147. 
9 Ibid at pages 134-135. 
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should exist regulation governed not by individual governments, but by an 
international trading organization, such as the WTO. However, if the WTO continues 
to only focus on legal disputes based on each country’s own interest, there might be 
no possibility of those peripheral – but not unimportant – matters to be taken into 
consideration, and thus, it will fail to make the regulation. This unfortunate result can 
be avoided by environmental NGOs’ participation in the WTO decision-making 
process. Indeed, it was mainly the environmental concern, although not the only 
factor, that caused NGO’s participation in the WTO to be supported by a glowing 
body of literature 
 
Despite these benefits, many people continue to resist NGO participation in 
the WTO. Based on a number of concerns, they try to exclude NGOs from a formal 
role in the WTO 10. The cons’ point could be classified into three categories. First, 
they maintain that the WTO was established as an inter-governmental trade 
organization, and that the trade policy process works best when governments can 
speak clearly to each other without the disruption of other voices. 
                                                
10 For the best arguments against participation, see Philip M. Nichols. “Realism, Liberalism, Values, 
and the World Trade Organization,” 17 University of Pennsylvania Journal of International Economic 
Law 851 (1996); William M. Reichert. “Note, Resolving the Trade and Environment Conflict: The 
WTO and NGO Consultative Relations,” 2 Minnesota Journal of Global Trade 219 (1996). 
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The original membership and accession is clearly confined under the Article XI and 
XII. 
 
Article XI 
Original Membership 
1. The contracting parties to GATT 1947 as of the date of entry into force of 
this Agreement, and the European Communities, which accept this 
Agreement and the Multilateral Trade Agreements and for which 
Schedules of Concessions and Commitments are annexed to GATT 1994 
and for which Schedules of Specific Commitments are annexed to GATS 
shall become original Members of the WTO. 
2. The least-developed countries recognized as such by the United Nations 
will only be required to undertake commitments and concessions to the 
extent consistent with their individual development, financial and trade 
needs or their administrative and institutional capabilities. 
 
Article XII 
Accession 
1. Any State or separate customs territory possessing full autonomy in the 
conduct of its external commercial relations and of the other matters 
provided for in this Agreement and the Multilateral Trade Agreements 
may accede to this Agreement, on terms to be agreed between it and the 
WTO. Such accession shall apply to this Agreement and the Multilateral 
Trade Agreements annexed thereto. 
….. 
 
A second set of concerns about the role of NGOs in the WTO relates to the 
matter of representation. It is argued that it will be difficult to ascertain how many 
and which people a particular group represents. The final concern is about 
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practicalities of NGO participation. This concern is based on potential practical 
procedural problems. Indeed, these raise a number of questions, such as, Who would 
be responsible for allocating to groups the title of “NGOs”? How would the extent of 
participation be delegated? Should there be a supreme voice among international 
bodies? Would the current problems of time limitations faced by governments in open 
meetings only be exacerbated?  
 
As shown above, there are still acute controversies concerning NGOs access 
to the WTO. But, interestingly, compared with the pros, there is little academic 
literature arguing against a broader role for NGOs within the WTO. Indeed, there are 
no wrong arguments presented by the pro side, which says that NGOs participation in 
the WTO can provide more information, that NGOs can also act as watchdogs, and 
that the NGOs’ role is essential, especially for environmental matters. Such strong 
arguments may be the reason little academic literature representing the cons’ side 
exists. However, in recent years, there has been an increasing concern about potential 
practical problems - shown above as the final concern – and it was widely believed 
that there would be implementing problems in spite of large benefit from NGO’s 
access to the WTO. In fact, these worries have been realized in actual cases, as it will 
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be presented below, particularly, in Section IV and V.  
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II. SHRIMP/TURTLE CASE 
 
1. The Origin of an Affair 
 
It is during the Shrimp/Turtle case that the long argument regarding NGO’s 
amicus curiae submission to the DSB firstly arose in actua l case. This case started 
with appeals from India, Pakistan, Thailand and Malaysia to dispute the import 
prohibition of certain shrimp and shrimp products imposed by the United States; the 
act restricting imports was based on the U.S claim that the above countries 
exterminated turtles in the process of shrimp fishing. In this case, both the Panel and 
the Appellate Body supported the appealing countries, and thus, it came to an end 
with the defeat of the U.S. However, the briefs submitted by the NGOs in the Panel’s 
deliberation process diverted discussion to another issue. This was initiated by two  
unexpected amicus curiae briefs submitted to the Panel. 
 
2. The Panel Stage 
A. The Panel’s Decision 
 
In the Shrimp/Turtle case, the Panel received two documents submitted by 
NGOs and rejected to take these documents into consideration. It was Article 13 of 
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the DSU on which the Panel based its ruling. 
 
Article 13 of the DSU 
Right to Seek Information 
1. Each panel shall have the right to seek information and technical advice 
from any individual or body which it deems appropriate. However, before a 
panel seeks such information or advice from any individual or body within 
the jurisdiction of a Member it shall inform the authorities of that Member. A 
Member should respond promptly  and fully to any request by a panel for 
such information as the panel considers necessary and appropriate. 
Confidential information which is provided shall not be revealed without 
formal authorization from the individual, body, or authorities of the Member 
providing the information. 
2. Panel may seek information from any relevant source and may consult 
experts to obtain their opinion on certain aspects of the matter. With respect 
to a factual issue concerning a scientific or other technical matter raised by a 
party to a dispute, a panel may request an advisory report in writing from an 
expert review group. Rules for the establishment of such a group and its 
procedures are set forth in Appendix 4.  
 
This article clearly describes that the panel has the authority to select the source and 
content of information, and based on this article, the Panel grants itself discretionary 
authority11. Based on the same article, the Panel also notes that accepting non-
requested information from non-governmental sources would be incompatible with 
the provisions of the DSU currently applied12. In sum, the Panel made a ruling that its 
                                                
11 United States – Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products, Report of the Panel, 
WT/DS58/R (15 May 1998), at paras 7.7-7.8. 
12 Ibid at para 7.8. 
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discretionary authority worked only upon its request, and that it did not have any 
authority to accept non-requested information from NGOs. Indeed, in this case, the 
Panel had not requested those two documents, which served as the reason for their 
rejection.  
 
However, the Panel did not try to block all non-requested information. By 
providing each party with a right to attach these documents as part of their own 
submissions to a panel, the Panel made one exception in allowing for non-requested 
information13. 
 
B. Implications of the Panel’s Ruling 
 
The Panel’s finding in the Shrimp/Turtle case can be simply summarized. 
Firstly, the Panel ruled that it has an authority, “discretionary authority”, to select 
information and the source of information, but that it does not have any authority to 
receive non-requested information from NGOs. Secondly, if any party wishes to put 
forward non-requested information, the party shall submit it as part of their own 
submissions in order for such information to be accepted by the panel.  
                                                
13 Ibid. 
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The Panel’s decision has three implications. First of all, the Panel’s decision 
shows its intention to keep its position as a judicial organization among sovereign 
states. As it was mentioned above, the Panel did not completely prohibit non-
requested information from NGOs. Rather, it offered any party a right to submit these 
documents as part of their own submission. This indicates the Panel’s intention to 
change the actual provider of this submission from the NGO to the filing government, 
which has such capacity as a Member of the DSB. In other words, the Panel’s main 
concern on this ruling was not excluding any non-requested information from NGOs, 
but retaining its characteristics as a judicial organization for Member countries only. 
Secondly, in order to keep its position, the Panel interpreted Article 13 based on a 
conservative viewpoint. Since the WTO was established as an inter-governmental 
organization, the articles also automatically show such color. The clause found in the 
second paragraph of Article 13 of the DSU stating, “With respect to a factual issue 
concerning a scientific or other technical matter raised by a party to a dispute, a panel 
may request an advisory report in writing from an expert review group”, illustrates 
this tendency particularly well. The sentence indicates that the purpose of Article 13 
is to inform that the panel may request an experts’ view when it is confronted with a 
scientific or technical matter, and thus, when it needs an experts’ view in order to 
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clearly understand a factual issue raised by a party. This is in line with the purposes of 
the panel’s establishment. Given that “each panel shall have the right to seek 
information and technical advice from any individual or body which it deems 
appropriate” and that “a panel may request an advisory report in writing from an 
expert review group”, the Panel ruled that it may request, but may not accept non-
requested information14. This ruling shows that the Panel used a narrow approach 
which is literal in nature, in the process of interpreting Article 13 of the DSU. This 
narrow approach can be understood considering that the Panel interpreted article 13 
based on a conservative viewpoint. Finally, it seems that the Panel wanted to use each 
party as a filter in brief selection. By passing over the burden of brief selection to 
each party, the panel can avoid the risk of being deluged with a number of non-
requested briefs. 
 
The Panel’s ruling was indeed in line with the aim of the DSB’s establishment, 
and thus, it does not request a huge change from the DSB. Therefore, if this original 
ruling had been accepted by the Appellate Body,  the amicus curiae submission issue 
would have been terminated in this case. 
                                                
14 Ibid at paras 7.7-7.8. 
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3. The Appellate Body’s Decision 
 
Since the Appellate Body did not reverse the Panel’s ruling, which said the 
import prohibition by the U.S cannot be justified under Article XX of GATT 1994, 
the U.S finally lost the case. However, by reversing the Panel’s ruling on the amicus 
curiae submissions, this dispute demonstrated various aspects of the case. In the  
Appellate Body’s stage, it did not annul the panel’s discretionary authority itself, but 
it reversed the Panel’s second finding, which said accepting non-requested 
information from non-governmental sources would be incompatible with the 
provisions of the DSU currently applied15.  
 
In this case, the Appellate Body fixed the panel’s discretionary authority, 
based on Article 13, in which the Panel also depended in granting itself its own 
discretionary authority. Based on this article, the Appellate Body noted that this 
authority embraces more than merely the choice and evaluation of the source of the 
information or advice which it may seek; A panel’s authority includes the authority to 
decide not to seek such information or advice at all16. This ruling specified the panel’s 
                                                
15 Shrimp/Turtle, above note 2, at paras 102-110. 
16 Ibid at para 104. 
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discretionary authority and emphasized that the panel does not have legal obligation 
to accept or give due consideration to amicus submissions made by NGOs. 
Concerning this, there is no difference between the two bodies’ findings on amicus 
curiae submissions. However, as mentioned above, the Appellate Body reversed the 
Panel’s ruling, prohibiting itself from receiving amicus submission from NGOs 
directly17. The based articles for this ruling were article 11 and 12 of the DSU.  
 
Article 11.  
Function of Panels 
The function of panels is to assist the DSB in discharging its responsibilities 
under this Understanding and the covered agreements. Accordingly, a panel 
should make an objective assessment of the matter before it, including an 
objective assessment of the facts of the case and the applicability of and 
conformity with the relevant covered agreements, and make such other 
findings as will assist the DSB in making the recommendations or in giving 
the rulings provided for in the covered agreements. Panels should consult 
regularly with the parties to the dispute and give them adequate opportunity 
to develop a mutually satisfactory solution. 
 
Article 12. 
Panel Procedures 
1. Panels shall follow the Working Procedures in Appendix 3 unless the 
panel decides otherwise after consulting the parties to the dispute. 
2. Panel procedures should provide sufficient flexibility so as to  ensure high-
quality panel reports, while not unduly delaying the panel process 
….. 
 
 
                                                
17 Ibid at paras 106-110. 
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Appendix 3  
Working Procedures 
12. Proposed timetable for panel work: 
….. 
(c) Receipt of written rebuttals of the parties:     ----- 2-3 weeks 
    (d) Date, time and place of second substantive meeting with the parties:    
----- 1-2 weeks 
    ….. 
    The above calendar may be changed in the light of unforeseen developments. 
Additional meetings with the parties shall be scheduled if required. 
 
In its report, the Appellate Body noted that; 
 
The thrust of Articles 12 and 13, taken together, is that the DSU accords to a 
panel established by the DSB, and engaged in a dispute settlement 
proceeding, ample and extensive authority to undertake and to control the 
process by which it informs itself both of the relevant facts of the dispute and 
of the legal norms and principles applicable to such facts. That authority, and 
the breadth thereof, is indispensably necessary to enable a panel to discharge 
its duty imposed by Article 11 of the DSU to “make an objective assessment 
of the matter before it, including an objective assessment of the facts of the 
case and the applicability of and conformity with the relevant covered 
agreements… .”18 
 
As shown above, the Appellate Body, in its legal interpretation, not only focused on 
Article 13 of the DSU, which is most highly related to the panel’s discretionary 
authority, but also in Article 11 and 12 of the DSU, which provide for the panel’s 
                                                
18 Ibid at para 106. 
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function and procedures. Based on Article 12, the Appellate Body found that the DSU 
accords to a panel ample and extensive authority to undertake and control the process, 
with which the panel can accomplish its function as described in Article 11 of the 
DSU. 
 
The Appellate Body also noted that; 
 
Against this context of broad authority vested in panels by the DSU, and 
given the object and purpose of the Panel’s mandate as revealed in Article 11, 
we do not believe that the word “seek” must necessarily be read, as 
apparently the Panel read it, in too literal a manner. That the Panel’s reading 
of the word “seek” is unnecessarily formal and technical in nature becomes 
clear should an “individual or body” first ask a panel for permission to file a 
statement or a brief19. 
 
The Appellate Body’s ruling can be summarized tha t the panel has ample and 
extensive authority to undertake and control the process which is essential for 
performing its function, and considering this, the word “seek” should be interpreted 
in a different way. Hereby, the Appellate Body drew article 11 and 12 of the DSU in 
the process of interpreting the word “seek”, and finally it eliminated the distinction 
between “requested” and “non-requested” information.  
                                                
19 Ibid at para 107. 
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4. Implications of the Appellate Body’s Ruling: Who is the 
Beneficiary? 
 
The Appellate Body’s ruling in the Shrimp/Turtle case resulted in a 
fundamental change regarding the issue of amicus curiae submissions. As presented 
above, the Panel’s ruling which prohibits itself from accepting non-requested briefs 
directly from NGOs was coincident with its purpose of existence, and thus, it dose 
not require huge alteration; it could terminate controversy concerning amicus curiae 
submissions here. However, by reversing this Panel’s ruling, the Appellate Body 
changed the whole situation.  
 
The Appellate Body’s finding that vanished the distinction between 
“requested” and “non-requested” has three implications. At first, this ruling seems to 
grant the panel more authority. As a matter of fact, the Appellate Body granted the 
panel the authority to accept even non-requested amicus briefs. However, considering 
that the Appellate Body already authorized the  panel’s discretionary authority, this 
ruling does not provide additional advantage. On the contrary, it in fact, indicates that 
an NGO can submit its brief regardless of whether or not it was requested. Therefore, 
the real beneficiary from this finding is not the panel but the NGOs. Secondly, the 
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Appellate Body’s finding is not fit for the panel’s purpose of existence. There is a 
clear distinction between the methods used by the two bodies’ in approaching the 
interpretation of the word “seek” in article 13 of the DSU. Whereas the Panel’s ruling 
was mainly based on article 13 of the DSU and only focused on finding out the 
intended purposes of that article, the Appellate Body used a “broad approach” in its 
legal interpretation. The different approaches used by the two bodies resulted in 
completely opposite conclusions. Finally, the Appellate Body’s ruling was made 
without preparing for actual procedures, either for the DSB or the NGOs, and this 
lack of procedure for receiving amicus submissions posed a variety of potential 
practical problems. The potential practical problems, indeed, were clearly exposed in 
the Carbon Steel case 
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III. CARBON STEEL CASE 
 
1. The Origin of an Affair 
 
The Carbon Steel case started with the appeal from European Communities to 
a panel against the imposition of countervailing duties on certain hot-rolled lead and 
bismuth carbon steel products originating in the United Kingdom acted by the United 
States. This case ended in the Panel stage with the defeat of the U.S., based on a 
ruling that the U.S violated Article 10 of the SCM Agreement20. The Appellate Body 
did not reverse this finding, and thus, the case was finally terminated21. In spite of no 
such distinct feature on the finding of these two bodies, the fact that NGOs submitted 
their briefs to the DSB again was enough to attract attention. In this Section, I review 
how the issue of amicus curiae submissions developed in the Carbon Steel case of 
which the Panel’s report was published 14 months after the Appellate Body 
eliminated the distinction between “request” and “non-request” information in the 
Shrimp/Turtle case. In the Carbon Steel case, this issue was brought up to the surface 
by a NGO, the American Iron and Steel Institute, which submitted its non-requested 
                                                
20 United States – Imposition of Countervailing Duties on Certain Hot-rolled Lead and Bismuth 
Carbon Steel Products Originating in the United Kingdom, Report of the Panel, WT/DS138/R (23 
December 1999), at para 7.1. 
21 Carbon Steel, above note 3, at para 75. 
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brief to the Panel. 
 
2. The Panel Stage 
 
In the Carbon Steel case, the Panel received a brief from the American Iron 
and Steel Institute (“AISI”), and refused to accept the AISI brief as a result of the late 
submission of the brief22. Indeed, the AISI’s brief was submitted after the deadline for 
the parties’ rebuttal submissions, and after the second substantive meeting of the 
Panel with the parties. The Panel noted that this late submission did not enable parties 
to have adequate opportunity to present their comments on the AISI brief to the Panel. 
In addition, since the Panel decided not to exercise the authority to delay its 
proceedings granted under the Article 12.1 of the DSU, the AISI’s brief was not taken 
into consideration in the Panel stage in this case23. 
 
 
 
 
                                                
22 Carbon Steel, above note 20, at para 6.3. 
23 Ibid. 
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3. The Appellate Body Stage 
A. The Appellate Body and Discretionary Authority 
 
On February 7th, 2000, the Appellate Body received two amicus curiae briefs 
from the American Iron and Steel Institute (AISI) and the Specialty Steel Industry of 
North America. The Appellate Body, which recognized a panel’s discretionary 
authority in the Shrimp/Turtle case, encountered the same challenge  in the very next 
case – among the cases in which the issue of the amicus curiae briefs were addressed 
- as a result of its own ruling that vanished the distinction between “requested” and 
“non-requested” information. In this case, since the Appellate Body primarily needed 
to establish its clear-cut line of authority under the DSU, the process of the  Appellate 
Body stage was not as simple as that of the Panel. In the Carbon Steel case, the 
question of whether or not the Appellate Body had the authority to receive amicus 
curiae submissions from NGOs was initially discussed. It was not easy for the 
Appellate Body to grant itself the discretionary authority, since, without doubt, 
Article 13 of the DSU, on which the panel’s discretionary authority was based, only 
applied to the panel. Indeed, European Communities maintained that the basis for 
allowing amicus curiae briefs in panel proceedings is Article 13 of the DSU, as 
explained in the  Shrimp/Turtle case, and that this article does not apply to the 
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Appellate Body24. However, The United States noted that, in the Shrimp/Turtle case, 
the Appellate Body explained that the authority to accept unsolicited submissions is 
found in the DSU’s grant to a panel of “ample and extensive authority to undertake 
and to control the process by which it informs itself both of the relevant facts of the 
dispute and of the legal norms and principles applicable to such facts.” According to 
the United States, it is clear that the Appellate Body also has such authority, given 
that Article 17.9 of the DSU authorizes the Appellate Body to draw up its own 
working procedures, and Rule 16(1) of the Working Procedures authorizes a division 
to create an appropriate procedure when a question arises that is not covered by the 
Working Procedures25. The Appellate Body adopted the approach advocated by the 
United States.  
 
Article 17.9 of the DSU provides: 
Procedures for Appellate Review 
Working procedures shall be drawn up by the Appellate Body in consultation 
with the Chairman of the DSB and the Director-General, and communicated 
to the Members for their information 
 
Rule 16(1) of the Working Procedures for Appellate Review provides: 
General Provisions 
In the interests of fairness and orderly procedure in the conduct of an appeal, 
where a procedural question arises that is not covered by these Rules, a 
                                                
24 Carbon Steel, above note 3, at para 36. 
25 Ibid at para 38. 
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division may adopt an appropriate procedure for the purposes of that appeal 
only, provided that it is not inconsistent with the DSU, the other covered 
agreements and these Rules. Where such a procedure is adopted, the Division 
shall immediately notify the participants and third participants in the appeal 
as well as the other Members of the Appellate Body.  
 
The Appellate Body noted that even though neither the DSU nor the Working 
Procedures specifically provide for, or prohibit its acceptance of amicus briefs, 
Article 17.9 of the DSU grants the Appellate Body broad authority to adopt 
procedural rules which do not conflict with any rules and procedures in the DSU or 
the covered agreements26. Hereby, the Appellate Body granted itself discretionary 
authority which it had granted to the panel in the Shrimp/Turtle case. Furthermore, the 
Appellate Body also specified its discretionary authority; in other words, the 
Appellate Body accentuated that its discretionary authority does not involve any legal 
duty to receive amicus curiae briefs from NGOs, as it had emphasized in the 
Shrimp/Turtle case for the panel. In this case, the Appellate Body accented this by re-
referring to the finding that it had made in the Shrimp/Turtle case for the panel. 
 
In the Shrimp/Turtle case, the Appellate Body emphasized that the panel does not 
have legal obligation to receive amicus submissions by noting that: 
                                                
26 Ibid at para 39. 
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… .. under the DSU, only Members who are parties to a dispute, or who have 
notified their interest in becoming third parties in such a dispute to the DSB, 
have a legal right to make submissions to, and have a legal right to have 
those submissions considered by, a panel. Correlatively, a panel is obliged in 
law to accept and give due consideration only to submissions made by the 
parties and the third parties in a panel proceeding27. 
 
In this case, the Appellate Body accentuated that the Appellate Body also does not 
have legal liability to receive NGOs’ submissions by re-noting this finding. 
 
B. The Appellate Body’s Decision 
 
In this case, the Appellate Body finally granted itself discretionary authority. 
However, the Appellate Body did not exercise this newly granted authority by simply 
stating that they have not found it necessary to take the two amicus curiae briefs filed 
into account in rendering the ir decision28. As a result, both amicus curiae submissions 
were not accepted by the Appellate Body. 
 
 
                                                
27 Shrimp/Turtle, above note 2, at para 101. 
28 Carbon Steel, above note 3, at para 42. 
 28 
IV. PRACTICAL PROBLEMS EXPOSED IN THE CARBON 
STEEL CASE 
 
Since the Shrimp/Turtle case had been closed, the Carbon Steel case was the 
first one among the cases in which the issue of the amicus curiae briefs were 
addressed. In this case, the Appellate Body granted itself discretionary authority 
which is exactly the same as what it had granted the panel in the Shrimp/Turtle case, 
and therefore, both the Panel and the Appellate Body were able to receive non-
requested briefs in this case. In other words, from this case, any NGO was granted to 
submit its brief regardless of whether or not it was requested. Actually, in this case, 
the Panel and the Appellate Body received one and two amicus submissions 
respectively. In the process of receiving these amicus submissions, various practical 
problems were exposed. 
 
1. Lack of Timetable and Format 
 
The NGOs’ documents rejected in the Panel stage clearly showed that there 
was no practical procedure on which the NGOs could depend as a guideline. In the 
Shrimp/Turtle case, the Appellate Body permitted NGOs to submit their briefs to the 
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panel, requested or not. However, it had not fixed the timetable for non-requested 
NGOs, and thus, they did not have any guideline in submitting their briefs in the 
Carbon Steel case. It was for this reason that the document from the AISI was 
rejected by the Panel as a result of late submission. This clearly showed the urgent 
necessity to fix the practicalities of the procedure. 
  
2. Discretionary Authority: Unclear Criterion in Brief Selection 
 
The decision of the Appellate Body in the Carbon Steel case definitely 
exposed what an ambiguous criterion discretionary authority is in selecting amicus 
curiae briefs. In the Carbon Steel case, the Appellate Body received two non-
requested briefs, with the reason of rejection being simple; In this case, the Appellate 
Body had a hard time granting itself discretionary authority, and it tried to specify the 
characteristics of this authority. Compared to this, the Appellate Body’s decision in 
the Carbon Steel case was relatively short. The Appellate Body rejected all amicus 
curiae briefs by simply stating that they have not found it necessary to take the two 
amicus curiae briefs filed into account in rendering their decision. Actually, this 
ruling can be justified by the characteristics of discretionary authority emphasized by 
the Appellate Body, which says the Appellate Body is obliged by law to accept and 
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give due cons ideration, only to submissions made by the parties and the third parties. 
However, from the NGOs’ point of view, this kind of unclear reason of rejection 
cannot be easily accepted. Unlikely rejection caused by a “late submission”, since the 
decision based on simply exercising discretionary authority cannot provide an explicit 
reason for being rejected, it is not easy for NGOs to accept.  
 
3. The Amicus Curiae Brief which was Already Rejected by the Panel  
 
The American Iron and Steel Institute (AISI), which made the issue of amicus 
curiae briefs arise again in the  Carbon Steel case by submitting its document to the 
Panel, also added one more point of controversy by submitting its document to the 
Appellate Body again. In the Carbon Steel case, this did not become the  main issue 
since the Appellate Body expressed the reason of rejection by simply stating that they 
have not found it necessary to take the two amicus curiae briefs filed into account in 
rendering their decision. However, the fact that the AISI’s brief submitted to the 
Appellate Body was what had already been rejected by the Panel would result in new 
problem, a capacity problem. So far, the appeal to the Appellate Body was confined 
within what was decided by the Panel. In other words, the brief that was excluded 
from the Panel’s consideration had no effect on the Panel’s decision at all, and thus, to 
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receive this kind of brief results in exceeding the range of the Appellate Body. In this 
case, it seemed there was a necessity for the Appellate Body to make a clear ruling on 
this capacity problem, instead of simply noting its newly granted discretionary 
authority as a reason of rejection, although that is the easiest way to reject any amicus 
brief. 
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V. ASBESTOS CASE 
 
1. The Origin of an Affair 
 
The Asbestos case started with the appeal from Canada to a panel against 
import prohibition of asbestos containing products imposed by France. In this case, 
although the claim of France was not supported by the Panel, Canada also failed to 
provide proper provisions to support its claim, ultimately preventing Canada from 
winning the case29. The Appellate Body reversed some of the Panel’s findings, 
however, it also concluded that France was not in violation, at least, concerning the 
issues Canada raised in this case, and thus, this case was terminated with the defeat of 
Canada30. The factor that makes this case significant is several NGOs’ amicus curiae 
submissions to the DSB. The Appellate Body’s efforts to resolve practical problems 
exposed in the Carbon Steel case resulted in new developments concerning this issue. 
In this Section, I present the process of dealing with NGOs’ briefs submitted to the 
Panel and the Appellate Body in the Asbestos case. 
 
 
                                                
29 European Communities – Measures Affecting Asbestos and Asbestos-containing Products, Report of 
the Panel, WT/DS135/R (18 September 2000), at para 9.1. 
30 Asbestos, above note 1, at paras 192-193. 
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2. The Panel’s Decision: Sticking to its Original Position 
 
In the Asbestos case, the Panel received four amicus curiae briefs. The NGOs 
that submitted to the Panel are the following: Collegium Remazzini, dated 7 May 
1999; Ban Asbestos Network, dated 22 July 1999; Instituto Mexicano de Fibro-
Industrias A.C., dated 26 July 1999; and American Federation of Labor and Congress 
of Industrial Organizations, dated 28 July 1999. Canada, the appellant, notified the 
Panel that, bearing in mind the general nature of the opinions expressed by the non-
governmental organizations in those submissions, they would not be useful to the 
Panel at this advanced stage of the proceedings31. EC informed the Panel that it 
incorporated into its own submissions the amicus briefs submitted by the Collegium 
Ramazzini and the American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial 
Organizations, as those bodies supported the EC’s scientific and legal arguments in 
this dispute32.  
 
The Panel decided that it would consider these two briefs that were submitted 
as a part of the EC’s document and that it would not include the others33. The Panel 
                                                
31 Asbestos, above note 29, at para 6.2. 
32 Ibid at paras 6.2-6.3. 
33 Ibid at para 6.3. 
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received one more amicus brief from the ONE (“Only Nature Endures”) on June  27th, 
2000, but refused to accept it due to its tardy submission34. Reviewing the Panel’s 
decision, one fact becomes clear. The Panel concurred with and reinforced its original 
position expressed in the Shrimp/Turtle case. In that case, the Panel stressed its 
discretionary authority and noted that amicus curiae briefs could be accepted only 
when it was submitted as a part of a party’s document. The decision that it would 
accept only the two amicus briefs incorporated into EC’s document clearly showed 
the Panel’s adherence to its original position. The additional amicus brief, submitted 
by the ONE, was rejected by the reason of late submission, which indicated that the 
practical problems that had been exposed in the Carbon Steel case were not resolved 
yet. 
 
3. The Appellate Body’s Efforts: ‘Additional Procedure’ in the 
Asbestos Dispute 
 
Since Canada did not accede to the Panel’s ruling, it appealed to the Appellate 
Body.  
 
                                                
34 Ibid at para 6.4. 
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In this case, the Appellate Body made an effort to solve practical problems 
exposed in the Carbon Steel case by clarifying the procedure rule. This effort was 
realized with the documents called ‘Additional Procedure35’ in the Asbestos dispute. 
The document was sent to the Chairman of the DSB by the Chairman of the Appellate 
Body on November 8th, 2000. It informed the Chairman of the DSB of the additional 
procedure adopted by the Division hearing the appeal in the  Asbestos dispute. The 
Appellate Body had depended more on DSU Article 17.9 than Rule 16(1) of the 
Working Procedures in the process of granting itself the authority to receive amicus 
curiae briefs, and in this document, the Appellate Body emphasized that this 
communication was only pursuant to Rule 16(1) of the Working Procedures for 
Appellate Review by noting as such three separate times: in the preface, sub-title and 
first paragraph of this document. This seemed to result from a lack of consultation 
with the Chairman of the DSB, which is enforced under DSU Article 17.9. Indeed, 
this document was simply presented to the Chairman of the DSB, and his/her input  
was not incorporated in its formation. 
 
The Appellate Body tried to solve practical procedural problems through this 
                                                
35 European Communities – Measures Affecting Asbestos and Asbestos-containing Products: 
Communication from the Appellate Body (hereinafter ‘Additional Procedure’), WT/DS135/9 (8 
November 2000). 
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document. Therefore, it presented several requirements concerning a timetable and 
structured format. In other words, it showed NGOs the deadline of their submissions 
and assigned a maximum page limit. In addition, the Appellate Body required that 
each NGO specify the nature of its interest in this appeal and that it indicate any 
relationship, if any, with any party or any third party to this dispute. This is of 
importance since it offered NGOs guidelines for their submission, and thus, left no 
room for rejection due to procedural or formal elements, but only a failure to meet 
them. Hereby, the possibility of acceptance increased, and the issue turned to how the 
Appellate Body would deal with amicus curiae briefs which satisfied these conditions. 
 
4. The Appellate Body’s Decision 
 
As mentioned above, the Additional Procedure was set in order to prepare for 
expected amicus curiae submissions in the Appellate Body stage. Actually, in this 
case, the Appellate Body received 17 amicus briefs. Six of them were rejected as they 
were submitted later than the due date regulated in paragraph 2 of the Additional 
Procedure36. The main issue became what decision the Appellate Body would make 
on the remaining 11 amicus briefs that were submitted before the deadline. The 
                                                
36 Asbestos, above note 1, at para 55. 
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Appellate Body finally rejected all these submissions with the reason being their 
failure to comply sufficiently with all the requirements set forth in paragraph 3 of the 
Additional Procedure37. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
37 Ibid at para 56. 
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VI. FUTURE AGENDA 
 
The acute dispute concerning NGOs’ submission to the  DSB was faced with a 
turning point in the Shrimp/Turtle case. In the Shrimp/Turtle case, by reversing the 
Panel’s decision that it does not have any authority to accept non-requested briefs 
from NGOs, the Appellate Body provided NGOs with a right to submit their briefs to 
the panel. It diverted the interest from whether NGOs’ participation in the WTO is 
desirable, to whether NGOs’ participation could be justified under the WTO 
Agreements. As a matter of fact, there were plenty of controversies concerning the 
legal justification under which the panel and the Appellate Body were granted 
discretionary authority. The Appellate Body’s ruling in the Carbon Steel case where it 
finally found that it also has discretionary authority, given that Article 17.9 of the 
DSU authorizes the Appellate Body to draw up its own working procedures, and 
Rules 16(1) of the Working Procedures, turned the core issue of amicus curiae brief 
submissions to how the panel and Appellate Body would treat NGOs’ briefs in actual 
cases. The Additional Procedure written by the Appellate Body in the Asbestos case 
heightened this concern.  
 
The practical problems that had hindered NGOs from submitting their briefs 
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to the DSB were removed, and the possibility to be accepted increased. However, the 
Appellate Body’s announcement of its decision to reject all 17 replies aroused huge 
repulsion from NGOs, since the stated reason of rejection was so ambiguous, 
especially for the 11 NGOs that submitted their briefs within hours of the deadline set 
forth in paragraph 2 of the Additional Procedure. Debra Steger, director of the 
Appellate Body’s secretariat noted that all would become clear when the body issued 
its report in March 2001. However, when the Appellate Body presented its report that 
the reason of rejection was for failure to comply sufficiently with all the requirements 
set forth in paragraph 3 of the Additional Procedure, most of the rejected NGOs could 
not understand, since they believed that those applications were written with 
scrupulous attention to the stated details. 
 
The whole process from the Shrimp/Turtle case to the Asbestos case leaves the 
following as a future agenda. 
 
1. Inconsistency between the Panel and the Appellate Body 
 
From the Shrimp/Turtle case to the  Asbestos case, the Panel maintained a 
different position from the Appellate Body. Whereas the Panel intended to limit NGO 
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submission by legal interpretation coincident with the establishing purpose of the 
DSB, the Appellate Body provided access to the DSB for NGOs by reversing the 
Panel’s findings, by doing so, eliminating the distinction between “requested” and 
“non-requested” information. This sort of inconsistency between the two bodies 
continued to be manifested in the Asbestos case. Whereas the Appellate Body made 
an effort to solve problems disclosed in former cases by setting up an Additional 
Procedure, the Panel still adhered to its standpoint that had been presented in the  
Shrimp/Turtle case. It is possible, in future cases, for the panel to change its position 
as a result of the Appellate Body’s try and effort in the Asbestos case. However, the 
inconsistencies that had been exposed until and throughout the Asbestos case are 
enough to warrant concern. Since this is an internal problem within the DSB, it is 
believed that unifying these different standpoints of the two bodies should be a 
priority for the DSB, and should be resolved prior to efforts in solving the practical 
problems presented in Chapter 2, 3 and 4 of this Section. 
 
2. A Deluge of Non-requested Briefs 
 
The first potential problem caused by the ruling of the Appellate Body 
vanishing the distinction between “requested” and “non-requested” information is the 
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possibility of being deluged with non-requested amicus curiae submissions. The 
number of amicus briefs started from two in the Shrimp/Turtle case, and increased to 
17 in the Asbestos case. More detailed investigation uncovers one more feature: 
Whereas, in the Shrimp/Turtle case, both NGOs were non-profitable organizations, 
profitable organizations, which intended to protect their own interest, were found 
among NGOs that submitted amicus briefs to the DSB in the Carbon Steel case. 
Furthermore, in the Asbestos case, even individuals submitted his or her document as 
one constituting NGO category. This is a result of the comprehensive term, “NGO”, 
which includes any person or organization not controlled by governments. 
Considering this wide coverage of the term “NGO”, any person has the capacity of a 
NGO, and this shows the possibility for the DSB to be overcrowded with 
innumerable amicus curiae briefs. When the DSB is deluged with non-requested 
briefs in future cases, the number of briefs will be overwhelming. Although the 
Appellate Body limited the maximum page of each application in the  Asbestos case – 
as it can do again in future cases – if a large number of amicus submissions are 
received, a page limit will fail to serve as a sufficient solution.  
 
In the Shrimp/Turtle case, the Appellate Body reversed the Panel’s finding 
 42 
that it was not granted to accept non-requested information from NGOs under the 
DSU provisions. This Panel decision was a method that enabled the DSB to use each 
party as a filter in the process of accepting innumerous amicus submissions. By 
reversing this ruling, the Appellate Body left the possibility of being flooded with 
non-requested briefs, and reviewing an increasing number and extended range of 
NGOs submissions in the Asbestos case, this is likely to be realized at a close date. 
 
As mentioned above, the Appellate Body’s reason of rejection was not enough 
to provide NGOs with a clear understand ing, in even the  most recent case, the 
Asbestos case. Without a doubt, there is a necessity to establish clear criterion 
concerning amicus curiae brief selections. However, it prior to this, the DSB should  
take measures to deal with the expected innumerable amicus submissions, as it is a 
prerequisite to making a decision on selection. 
 
3. Clear Criterion in Brief Selection 
 
To establish clear standards in the process of accepting amicus curiae briefs is 
one of the most important tasks. Whereas considering how to cope with a number of 
amicus briefs is the potential problems for future cases, fixing a clear criterion in brief 
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selection is needed to resolve problems that have already been exposed in former 
cases. Although the Additional Procedure was made in the Asbestos case, there was 
fierce resistance to the Appellate Body’s decision to reject all 17 amicus submissions. 
This mainly resulted from a lack of clear standard in brief selection 
     
The Additional Procedure consists of two parts. The first three paragraphs are 
procedural regulations for application, and the remaining part is for granted 
applications of leave to file a brief. In the Asbestos case, no application was granted 
by the Appellate Body, which said all of them either violated the deadline set forth in 
paragraph 2, or failed to comply sufficiently with all the requirements set forth in 
paragraph 3 of the Additional Procedure. 
 
The NGOs that showed furious resistance to this ruling were those who were 
rejected under the paragraph 3 of the Additional Procedure. Paragraph 3 is composed 
of 7 sub-paragraphs, which requires the submissions to adhere to the following: to be 
dated and signed by the applicant; to be no longer than three typed pages; to contain a 
description of the applicant; to specify the nature of the interest the applicant has in 
this appeal; and to identify the specific issues of law covered in the Panel Report and 
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a legal interpretation thereof to be addressed in the applicant’s written brief. The last 
two sub-paragraphs of paragraph 3 are the following: 
 
(f) state why it would be desirable, in the interests of achieving a satisfactory 
settlement of the matter at issue, in accordance with the rights and 
obligations of WTO Members under the DSU and the other covered 
agreements, for the Appellate Body to grant the application leave to file a 
written brief in this appeal; and indicate, in particular, in what way the 
application will make a contribution to the resolution of this dispute that is 
not likely to be repetitive of what has been already submitted by a party or 
third party to this dispute. 
(g) contain a statement disclosing whether the applicant has any relationship, 
direct or indirect, with any party or any third party to this dispute, as well as 
whether it has, or will, receive any assistance, financial or otherwise, from a 
party or a third party to this dispute in the preparation of its application for 
leave or its written brief38. 
 
What made those 11 NGOs unable to understand was the Appellate Body’s 
ambiguous  announcement, which said they had not complied with a specific section 
of the rules set forth in paragraph 3 of the Additional Procedure. The Appellate Body 
did not clearly notify each NGO of which specific section was not complied by it, and 
this was the main reason why the Appellate Body failed to make them clearly 
understood. Robert Howse, the professor from Michigan, who claimed he wrote his 
application with detailed attention to the stated requirements, represents the 
                                                
38 Additional Procedure, above note 35, page 2. 
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standpoint of those 11 NGOs. 
 
Without a doubt, the panel and the Appellate Body, as they emphasized in the  
Shrimp/Turtle case and the Carbon Steel case, are obliged by law to accept and give 
due consideration only to submissions made by the parties and the third parties, and 
thus, rejecting all amicus curiae submissions by exercising their discretionary 
authority can be justified under this ruling, at least from a legal perspective. 
 
There are two possible motives that led the Appellate Body to reject all 11 
amicus briefs that were received before the required deadline. The first possibility is 
that all these briefs indeed failed to comply sufficiently with all the requirements set 
forth in paragraph 3 of the Additional Procedure as officially announced by the 
Appellate Body in its report. In this case, the Appellate Body will be able to prevent 
NGOs’ objections before they arise again in future cases, simply by describing in 
detail which sub-paragraph is not complied to by each NGO. The other possibility is, 
as insisted by Robert Howse, that there simply was no failure to satisfy all the 
requirements set forth in paragraph 3 of the Additional Procedure. The fact that all 7 
sub-paragraphs of paragraph 3 are either too easy to comply with or too ambiguous 
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supports this idea. As shown above, the first two sub-paragraphs of paragraph 3 of the 
Additional Procedure, which respectively required to be dated and signed by the 
applicant, and to be no longer than three typed pages, are easy enough to comply with. 
Moreover, the others are so ambiguous that the Appellate Body can make any 
decision based on this. Sub-paragraph (f) in particular, which requires the applicant to 
indicate, explicitly, the way in which the application will make a new and different 
contribution to the resolution of the dispute, is so ambiguous that the Appellate Body 
can reject any NGO’s submission based on this. 
 
No one, as an outsider, can be certain as to which of the above cases actually 
occurred the process of the Appellate Body’s decision. However, even if the 
Appellate Body’s announcement was based on the truth, it is also true that the 
“Appellate Body” caused serious resistance by making an obscure announcement. 
Furthermore, if their claims for refusal are not based on the truth, in other words, if 
there were some amicus submissions that succeeded to comply sufficiently with all 
the requirements set forth in paragraph 3 of the Additional Procedure, the Appellate 
Body should have announced that these were rejected on the basis of its discretionary 
authority instead of noting that there was failure made on the part of the NGOs. 
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However, to reject amicus curiae submissions based on discretionary authority might 
make this controversy even more complex. Although this authority was granted to the  
panel and Appellate Body under the DSU agreements, if the Appellate Body rejected 
NGOs’ briefs by simply stating that it exercised its discretionary authority, there is no 
reason for NGOs to spend time and effort in making their documents comply with all 
the requirements set forth in the Additional Procedure. It is this concern that makes 
the Appellate Body hesitant to mention “discretionary authority” in its actual ruling. 
Indeed, the term “discretionary authority” is the core in the whole amicus curiae 
submission issue. 
 
As mentioned above, no one, except the Appellate Body itself, knows whether 
the Appellate Body indeed believed all 11 documents had not complied with a 
specific section of the rules for making applications. Therefore looking at this from a 
new angle could be more productive. Hereby, one question can be raised as to 
whether the Appellate Body cannot accept amicus curiae submissions, even if the 
Appellate Body believed there were some amicus briefs satisfying all requirements 
and thought it to be contributive to the resolution of this dispute. And if not, why? 
What led it to reject all those amicus curiae submissions? The answer can be found 
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under the more detailed investigation into the contents of the amicus briefs and the 
intrinsic attribute of the DSB as an inter-governmental judicial organization, which is 
presented in the next Chapter. 
 
4. The DSB as an Inter-governmental Judicial Organization versus 
NGOs’ Own Legal Interpretation 
 
Whereas establishing clear criterion in the process of brief selection is the 
most important task of the DSB, the fact that the DSB is an inter-governmental 
judicial organization is what makes it difficult. More precisely speaking, that fact 
prevents the DSB from receiving any amicus curiae brief, at least as a form of an 
independent legal document. As mentioned above, the Panel’s legal interpretation of 
DSU Article 13 was consistent with the aim of DSB establishment. In the  
Shrimp/Turtle case, the Panel ruled that it could accept non-requested briefs only 
when the brief was submitted as a part of each party’s document. 
 
The purpose of Article 13 is only to inform that a panel may request an 
experts’ view when the panel is faced with a scientific or technical matter, and thus, 
when it needs an expert’s view in order to clearly understand a factual issue raised by 
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a party. The second paragraph of this article clearly shows this. In the process of 
panel’s request for a factual issue concerning a scientific or other technical matter, 
there is no possibility of a dispute being infiltrated by NGOs’ own legal interpretation. 
Indeed, DSU article 13 was established in line with the purpose of DSB establishment 
as an inter-governmental judicial organization. In other words, the DSB was 
established in order to solve trade disputes among sovereign states, and the provisions 
of DSB supported it. However, the harmony between the DSB and its provisions was 
rupture by the Appellate Body in the Shrimp/Turtle case. The Appellate Body’s 
finding permitted NGOs to submit its brief regardless of whether or not it was 
requested, and this resulted in the possibility of the DSB being infiltrated by NGOs’ 
own legal interpretation. 
 
The Panel’s ruling does not only exclude the possibility of the DSB being 
deluged with innumerous non-requested briefs, but also allows for a limitation of two 
parties, that of the appellant and the appellee. And limiting the parties to only two 
sovereign states is indeed coincided with the intrinsic attribute and the purpose of the 
DSB. Compared to this simple two-sided conflict, the Appellate Body’s ruling 
resulted in increasing the number of parties innumerably. 
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Furthermore, it is not consistent with its own finding in the Shrimp/Turtle case. 
The Appellate Body clearly ruled that NGOs cannot be members of the DSB. The 
Appellate Body noted that: 
 
It may be well to stress at the outset that access to the dispute settlement 
process of the WTO is limited to Members of the WTO. This access is not 
available, under the WTO Agreement and the covered agreements as they 
currently exist, to individuals or international organizations, whether 
governmental or non-governmental39. 
 
To directly accept amicus curiae submissions including individual legal 
interpretations made by the NGOs, realistically results in providing essentially the  
same capacity of the parties to the NGOs. This clearly conflicts with the Appellate 
Body’s own ruling which prohibited NGO’s accession to the dispute settlement 
process. This is the reason why the Appellate Body could not accept any amicus 
submissions in the earlier Asbestos case. For this reason, the ruling that NGOs’ 
submissions can be accepted only when submitted as a part of the party’s documents, 
presents two advantages: First, it changes an actual offender of this submission from 
an NGO to the government, which has the capacity as a Member in the DSB. 
Secondly, hereby, the amicus brief including NGO’s own legal interpretation can be 
                                                
39 Shrimp/Turtle, above note 2, at para 101. 
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treated as a legal interpretation of each party. In sum, even though the establishment 
of a clear criterion regarding brief selection is the most important task for the DSB, it 
might not be easily solved since the DSB was initially established as an inter-
governmental organization with the aim to solve trade disputes. To overcome this 
conflict is the most significant, and at the same time, the most difficult, task for the 
DSB. 
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VII. CONCLUSION: NEW POSITION OF THE DSB IN 21ST 
CENTURY 
 
In recent years, there have been many controversies on the topic of whether or 
not NGOs’ participation in the WTO is desirable. Considering increasing activities of 
NGOs in the global arena, this argument seems to be unavoidable. The Appellate 
Body appeased this acute dispute by its ruling which permitted NGOs to submit their 
amicus briefs to the panel in the Shrimp/Turtle case. The intention of this finding 
could be understood from several points of view. First, it could be understood from 
the perspective of international political pressure. Otherwise, this ruling could be the 
pure result of the Appellate Body’s agreement with the pro’s opinion. In this paper, 
the intention of the Appellate Body was not investigated, rather I focused on 
presenting what kinds of problems arose following this ruling, which problems have 
yet to be solved, and factors that may hinder the DSB from resolving these problems. 
I attempted this through a review of the cases in which the issue of amicus curiae 
briefs were addressed. 
 
Now, the Appellate Body is confronted with a difficult situation, which was, 
ironically, caused by its own finding in the Shrimp/Turtle case. However, it does not 
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mean the opinion of those who resisted NGO participation in the WTO is completely 
right, rather what the whole process from the Shrimp/Turtle case to the Asbestos case 
indicated, is that this Appellate Body’s ruling was hasty and made with a lack of 
preparation. Before eliminating the distinction between “requested” and “non-
requested” information in the Shrimp/Turtle case, the Appellate Body should have 
seriously considered its main role and function with utmost priority. In short, it should  
have thought about its intrinsic attribute as an inter-governmental judicial 
organization. Without a doubt, the WTO, and especially the DSB, encompasses 
different internal characteristics from that of the UN. It seemed that the Appellate 
Body failed, or at least did not sufficiently, take note of this distinction. If this was 
clearly noted, the Appellate Body should have not reversed the Panel’s ruling in the 
Shrimp/Turtle case. For the DSB, as an inter-governmental organization which was 
established in order to judge international trade disputes, it is almost impossible to 
receive amicus curiae submissions from NGOs that include their own legal 
interpretations, and that are submitted with an independent capacity. However, it is 
also impossible now for the Appellate Body to reverse its own ruling in the 
Shrimp/Turtle case, and thus, reviving the distinction between “requested” and “non-
requested” information. 
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As shown in the Introduction, the pro’s opinion concerning NGOs’ 
participation in the  WTO deserves to be accepted. However, the problem is that it 
makes the DSB have difficulty in pursuing its original role as an inter-governmental 
judicial organization. Now, for the DSB, which already permitted NGOs to submit 
their amicus briefs, it is required to harmonize these two. Since the DSB already 
permitted amicus curiae submissions, without a reinterpretation of its own position, 
there is no way to harmonize them. But given that the DSB’s role becomes more and 
more important in a globalized world, this repositioning should be done with great 
caution. Certainly, this reassessment of the DSB is very risky, but it is widely 
believed that any organization cannot work well permanently without any change. 
Reviewing the whole process from the Shrimp/Turtle to the Asbestos case, the DSB 
has shown itself to currently be at a total deadlock. In order to break this, it is 
believed that the DSB should reinvent ; it should adjust its function in accordance to 
the evolution of international organizations and their heightened role in the global 
arena. It is hoped that the present review and discussion can initiate a more in-depth 
look into the matter. 
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APPENDIX A 
 
 
The Number of NGOs in Consultative Status with the ECOSOC 
 
Year General  Special  Roster Total  
1948 13 26 2 41 
1968 17 78 222 317 
1992 38 297 533 868 
1993 40 334 560 934 
1994 40 334 560 934 
1995 65 406 563 1034 
1996 76 468 646 1190 
1997 85 582 666 1333 
1998 100 742 669 1511 
1999 111 918 672 1701 
 
Source: Sungsoo, Joo, and Youngjin, Seo. United Nations, NGOs, and Global Civil 
Society. Seoul: University of Hanyang Press, 2000. 
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APPENDIX B 
 
 
Privileges and Obligations of NGOs in Consultative Status with the 
ECOSOC 
 
Privileges/Obligations  General  Special  Roster 
Relevance to the work of ECOSOC All areas 
Some 
areas 
Limited 
Are in consultative status with ECOSOC Yes Yes Yes 
Designate UN representatives Yes Yes Yes 
Invited to UN conferences Yes Yes Yes 
Propose items for ECOSOC agenda Yes No No 
Attend UN meetings Yes Yes Yes 
Can speak at ECOSOC Yes No No 
Circulate statements at ECOSOC meetings 
2000 
words 
500  
words 
No 
Circulate statements at ECOSOC subsidiary 
bodies' meetings 
2000 
words 
1500 
words 
No 
Can speak at ECOSOC subsidiary bodies' 
meetings 
Yes Yes No 
Must submit quadrennial reports Yes Yes No 
 
Source: http://www.un.org/esa/coordination/ngo/ 
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WT/DS135/9, 8 November 2000 
 
EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES – MEASURES AFFECTING ASBESTOS 
AND ASBESTOS-CONTAINING PRODUCTS 
 
Communication from the Appellate Body 
 
 
 The following communication, dated 8 November 2000, was addressed by 
the Chairman of the Appellate Body to the Chairman of the Dispute Settlement Body, 
informing him of the additional procedure adopted by the Division hearing the appeal 
in European Communities – Measures Affecting Asbestos and Asbestos-Containing 
Products, pursuant to Rule 16(1) of the Working Procedures for Appellate Review. 
 
_______________ 
 
 
 I am writing to inform you that the Division hearing the above appeal has 
decided, in the interests of fairness and orderly procedure in the conduct of this 
appeal, to adopt an additional procedure to deal with any written briefs received by 
the Appellate Body from persons other than a party or a third party to this dispute. 
This additional procedure has been adopted by the Division hearing this appeal for 
the purposes of this appeal only pursuant to Rule 16(1) of the Working Procedures for 
Appellate Review, and is not a new working procedure drawn up by the Appellate 
Body pursuant to paragraph 9 of Article 17 of the Understanding on Rules and 
Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes. 
 
 Attached, for your information, is a copy of this additional procedure. 
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European Communities – Measures Affecting Asbestos and 
Asbestos-Containing Products 
AB-2000-11 
Additional Procedure Adopted Under Rule 16(1) of the 
Working Procedures for Appellate Review 
 
 
To All Participants and Third Participants: 
 
 
1. In the interests of fairness and orderly procedure in the conduct of this appeal, the 
Division hearing this appeal has decided to adopt, pursuant to Rule 16(1) of the 
Working Procedures for Appellate Review, and after consultations with the parties 
and third parties to this dispute, the following additional procedure for purposes of 
this appeal only.  
 
2. Any person, whether natural or legal, other than a party or a third party to this 
dispute, wishing to file a written brief with the Appellate Body, must apply for 
leave to file such a brief from the Appellate Body by noon on Thursday, 16 
November 2000. 
 
3.  An application for leave to file such a written brief shall:  
 
(a) be made in writing, be dated and signed by the applicant, and include 
the address and other contact details of the applicant; 
 
(b)    be in no case longer than three typed pages; 
 
(c) contain a description of the applicant, including a statement of the 
membership and legal status of the applicant, the general objectives 
pursued by the applicant, the nature of the activities of the applicant, 
and the sources of financing of the applicant;  
 
(d) specify the nature of the interest the applicant has in this appeal;  
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(e) identify the specific issues of law covered in the Panel Report and 
legal interpretations developed by the Panel that are the subject of this 
appeal, as set forth in the Notice of Appeal (WT/DS135/8) dated 
23 October 2000, which the applicant intends to address in its written 
brief; 
 
(f) state why it would be desirable, in the interests of achieving a 
satisfactory settlement of the matter at issue, in accordance with the 
rights and obligations of WTO Members under the DSU and the other 
covered agreements, for the Appellate Body to grant the applicant 
leave to file a written brief in this appeal;  and indicate, in particular, 
in what way the applicant will make a contribution to the resolution of 
this dispute that is not likely to be repetitive of what has been already 
submitted by a party or third party to this dispute;  and 
 
(g) contain a statement disclosing whether the applicant has any 
relationship, direct or indirect, with any party or any third party to this 
dispute, as well as whether it has, or will, receive any assistance, 
financial or otherwise, from a party or a third party to this dispute in 
the preparation of its application for leave or its written brief. 
 
4.  The Appellate Body will review and consider each application for leave to file a 
written brief and will, without delay, render a decision whether to grant or deny 
such leave.  
 
5.  The grant of leave to file a brief by the Appellate Body does not imply that the 
Appellate Body will address, in its Report, the legal arguments made in such a 
brief.  
 
6.  Any person, other than a party or a third party to this dispute, granted leave to file 
a written brief with the Appellate Body, must file its brief with the Appellate 
Body Secretariat by noon on Monday, 27 November 2000.  
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7. A written brief filed with the Appellate Body by an applicant granted leave to file 
such a brief shall:  
 
(a)    be dated and signed by the person filing the brief; 
 
(b)    be concise and in no case longer than 20 typed pages, including any 
appendices; and 
 
(c)    set out a precise statement, strictly limited to legal arguments, 
supporting the applicant's legal position on the issues of law or legal 
interpretations in the Panel Report with respect to which the applicant 
has been granted leave to file a written brief. 
 
8.  An applicant granted leave shall, in addition to filing its written brief with the 
Appellate Body Secretariat, also serve a copy of its brief on all the parties and 
third parties to the dispute by noon on Monday, 27 November 2000.  
 
9.  The parties and the third parties to this dispute will be given a full and adequate 
opportunity by the Appellate Body to comment on and respond to any written 
brief filed with the Appellate Body by an applicant granted leave under this 
procedure. 
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1. 11 of 17 Amicus Curiae Briefs Submitted within the Time Limit of Noon 
on Thursday, 16 November 2000  
1. Professor Robert Lloyd Howse (United States) 
2. Occupational & Environmental Diseases Association (United Kingdom) 
3. American Public Health Association (United States) 
4. Centro de Estudios Comunitarios de la Universidad Nacional de Rosario 
(Argentina) 
5. Only Nature Endures (India) 
6. International Council on Metals and the Environment and American 
Chemistry Council (United States) 
7. Korea Asbestos Association (Korea) 
8. European Chemical Industry Council (Belgium) 
9. Australian Centre for Environmental Law at the Australian National 
University (Australia) 
10. Associate Professor Jan McDonald and Mr. Don Anton (Australia) 
11. Joint application from 
1. Foundation for Environmental Law and Development (United 
Kingdom) 
2. Center for International Environmental Law (Switzerland) 
3. International Ban Asbestos Secretariat (United Kingdom) 
4. Ban Asbestos International and Virtual Network (France) 
5. Greenpeace International (The Netherlands) 
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6. World Wide Fund for Nature, International (Switzerland) 
7. Lutheran World Federation (Switzerland) 
 
2. Six of 17 Amicus Curiae Briefs Submitted after the Deadline of Noon on 
Thursday, 16 November 2000 
1. Association of Personal Injury Lawyers (United Kingdom) 
2. All India A.C. Pressure Pipe Manufacturer's Association (India) 
3. International Confederation of Free Trade Unions/European Trade Union 
Confederation (Belgium) 
4. Maharashtra Asbestos Cement Pipe Manufacturers' Association (India) 
5. Roofit Industries Ltd. (India) 
6. Society for Occupational and Environmental Health (United States) 
7. Dated 6 February 2001, seven NGOs filed a joint amicus curiae brief, despite 
the fact that their application for leave to file a written brief had been denied 
before. The Appellate Body didn't accept this brief. 
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Legal Texts Pertaining to Amicus Curiae, NGOs and the WTO  
 
1.  Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization 
 
Article V  
Relations with Other Organizations  
1. The General Council shall make appropriate arrangements for effective 
cooperation with other intergovernmental organizations that have 
responsibilities related to those of the WTO.  
2. The General Council may make appropriate arrangements for consultation 
and cooperation with non-governmental organizations concerned with matters 
related to those of the WTO.  
 
2.  Excerpts from the Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the 
Settlement of Disputes 
 
Article 13  
Right to Seek Information  
1. Each panel shall have the right to seek information and technical advice from 
any individual or body which it deems appropriate. However, before a panel 
seeks such information or advice from any individua l or body within the 
jurisdiction of a Member it shall inform the authorities of that Member. A 
Member should respond promptly and fully to any request by a panel for such 
information as the panel considers necessary and appropriate. Confidential 
information which is provided shall not be revealed without formal 
authorization from the individual, body, or authorities of the Member  
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providing the information.  
2. Panels may seek information from any relevant source and may consult 
experts to obtain their opinion on certain aspects of the matter. With respect to 
a factual issue concerning a scientific or other technical matter raised by a 
party to a dispute, a panel may request an advisory report in writing from an 
expert review group. Rules for the establishment of such a group and its 
procedures are set forth in Appendix 4.  
 
Article 17 
Appellate Review 
Standing Appellate Body  
1. A standing Appellate Body shall be established by the DSB. The Appellate 
Body shall hear appeals from panel cases. It shall be composed of seven 
persons, three of whom shall serve on any one case. Persons serving on the 
Appellate Body shall serve in rotation. Such rotation shall be determined in 
the working procedures of the Appellate Body.  
2. The DSB shall appoint persons to serve on the Appellate Body for a four-year 
term, and each person may be reappointed once. However, the terms of three 
of the seven persons appointed immediately after the entry into force of the 
WTO Agreement shall expire at the end of two years, to be determined by lot. 
Vacancies shall be filled as they arise. A person appointed to replace a person 
whose term of office has not expired shall hold office for the remainder of the 
predecessor's term.  
3. The Appellate Body shall comprise persons of recognized authority, with 
demonstrated expertise in law, international trade and the subject matter of the 
covered agreements generally. They shall be unaffiliated with any 
government. The Appellate Body membership shall be broadly representative 
of membership in the WTO. All persons serving on the Appellate Body shall 
be available at all times and on short notice, and shall stay abreast of dispute  
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settlement activities and other relevant activities of the WTO. They shall not 
participate in the consideration of any disputes that would create a direct or 
indirect conflict of interest.  
4. Only parties to the dispute, not third parties, may appeal a panel report. Third 
parties which have notified the DSB of a substantial interest in the matter 
pursuant to paragraph 2 of Article 10 may make written submissions to, and 
be given an opportunity to be heard by, the Appellate Body.  
5. As a general rule, the proceedings shall not exceed 60 days from the date a 
party to the dispute formally notifies its decision to appeal to the date the 
Appellate Body circulates its report. In fixing its timetable the Appellate 
Body shall take into account the provisions of paragraph 9 of Article 4, if 
relevant. When the Appellate Body considers that it cannot provide its report 
within 60 days, it shall inform the DSB in writing of the reasons for the delay 
together with an estimate of the period within which it will submit its report. 
In no case shall the proceedings exceed 90 days.  
6. An appeal shall be limited to issues of law covered in the panel report and 
legal interpretations developed by the panel.  
7. The Appellate Body shall be provided with appropriate administrative and 
legal support as it requires.  
8. The expenses of persons serving on the Appellate Body, including travel and 
subsistence allowance, shall be met from the WTO budget in accordance with 
criteria to be adopted by the General Council, based on recommendations of 
the Committee on Budget, Finance and Administration.  
Procedures for Appellate Review  
9. Working procedures shall be drawn up by the Appellate Body in consultation 
with the Chairman of the DSB and the Director-General, and communicated 
to the Members for their information.  
10. The proceedings of the Appellate Body shall be confidential. The reports of 
the Appellate Body shall be drafted without the presence of the parties to the 
 67 
APPENDIX E (cont’d) 
   dispute and in the light of the information provided and the statements made. 
11. Opinions expressed in the Appellate Body report by individuals serving on 
the Appellate Body shall be anonymous.  
12. The Appellate Body shall address each of the issues raised in accordance with 
paragraph 6 during the appellate proceeding.  
13. The Appellate Body may uphold, modify or reverse the legal findings and 
conclusions of the panel. 
Adoption of Appellate Body Reports  
14. An Appellate Body report shall be adopted by the DSB and unconditionally 
accepted by the parties to the dispute unless the DSB decides by consensus 
not to adopt the Appellate Body report within 30 days following its 
circulation to the Members. This adoption procedure is without prejudice to 
the right of Members to express their views on an Appellate Body report.  
 
Article 18  
Communications with the Panel or Appellate Body  
1. There shall be no ex parte communications with the panel or Appellate Body 
concerning matters under consideration by the panel or Appellate Body.  
2. Written submissions to the panel or the Appellate Body shall be treated as 
confidential, but shall be made available to the parties to the dispute. Nothing 
in this Understanding shall preclude a party to a dispute from disclosing 
statements of its own positions to the public. Members shall treat as 
confidential information submitted by another Member to the panel or the 
Appellate Body which that Member has designated as confidential. A party to 
a dispute shall also, upon request of a Member, provide a non-confidential 
summary of the information contained in its written submissions that could be 
disclosed to the public.  
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3.  Excerpt from the Working Procedures for Appellate Review  
 
WT/AB/WP/3  
Part II, Process  
General Provisions  
Article 16 
(1) In the interests of fairness and orderly procedure in the conduct of an appeal, 
where a procedural question arises that is not covered by these Rules, a 
division may adopt an appropriate procedure for the purposes of that appeal 
only, provided that it is not inconsistent with the DSU, the other covered 
agreements and these Rules. Where such a procedure is adopted, the Division 
shall immediately notify the participants and third participants in the appeal as 
well as the other Members of the Appellate Body. 
(2) In exceptional circumstances, where strict adherence to a time period set out 
in these Rules would result in a manifest unfairness, a party to the dispute, a 
participant, a third party or a third participant may request that a division 
modify a time period set out in these Rules for the filing of documents or the 
date set out in the working schedule for the oral hearing. Where such a request 
is granted by a division, any modification of time shall be notified to the 
parties to the dispute, participants, third parties and third participants in a 
revised working schedule.  
 
Article 17  
(1) Unless the DSB decides otherwise, in computing any time period stipulated in 
the DSU or in the special or additional provisions of the covered agreements, 
or in these Rules, within which a communication must be made or an action 
taken by a WTO Member to exercise or preserve its rights, the day from which 
the time period begins to run shall be excluded and, subject to paragraph 2, the  
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last day of the time-period shall be included.  
(2) The DSB Decision on "Expiration of Time-Periods in the DSU", 
WT/DSB/M/7, shall apply to appeals heard by divisions of the Appellate 
Body.  
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